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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
MANY RAPIDLY EXPANDING cities in low and lower middle
income countries experience poor service coverage and
inadequate water supplies and sanitation services. Mu-
nicipalities or Water Utilities face a major challenge to
improve services for their existing population and meet
the demands arising from the high population growth.
Cities in developing countries are expected to grow by
160 per cent during the period from 1990 – 2030 (Briscoe
1993). A key concern is usually finance. The consumers
resist paying higher water tariffs because they receive
unreliable services and private/public finance institu-
tions will not lend money to improve those services until
there is substantial increases in revenue from water
tariffs - a ‘vicious circle’ is the result. This is represented
in Figure 1 below. Investment in infrastructure as a
proportion of GDP is expected to grow in many develop-
ing countries and Governments will not be able to meet
this demand from their own resources. Clearly there is a
need to attract funding from both public and private
Financial Institutions. The question is how to move to a
virtuous circle and provide better services to a greater
number of customers?
Key mechanisms for change
In Figure 1 a two-way arrow is indicated between:
• Improving O&M (operation and maintenance) and
Services.
• Higher tariffs and cost recovery.
This highlights the fact that these aspects are closely
interdependent and both need to be addressed together in
order to move towards sustainable management. The
‘virtuous circle’ entails improving O&M and services
and raising tariffs in order to attract private/public sector
finance and thus improve the infrastructure and service
coverage, which then enables further improvements in
the service to customers. In many water supply institu-
tions substantial increases in tariff levels will be required
before the private sector are willing to provide capital
finance. To bring about the necessary changes, three key
interrelated mechanisms have been found to be success-
ful:
• Contracting out services or private sector participa-
tion (PSP).
• Commercialisation.
• Customer protection and regulation.
For most water utilities, it would be beneficial to use all
three of these mechanisms to achieve the improvement of
services to a greater number of customers. The main
advantages of PSP are that it introduces private sector
incentives and management skills, and acts as a catalyst
for change. But thorough preparatory work and careful
selection of the type of contract is required, if these
advantages are to lead to substantial benefits.
Figure 1
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Types of PSP contracts
PSP contracts for infrastructure service provision have
been conveniently categorised into a number of different
types of contract that are briefly described below in order
of increasing scope and complexity: Specific contracts
can also be developed with features from two or more
types of contract discussed.
Service Contracts are the simplest form of PSP whereby
the public authority retains overall responsibility for
operation and maintenance of the system, except for the
specific system components that are contracted out. The
Contractor’s responsibility is limited to managing its
own personnel and services efficiently. Typically, serv-
ice contracts are used for maintenance of components
such as pumping stations and meter reading. Payment is
usually on a lump sum basis dependant on achieving
certain agreed targets. A typical contract duration 1 – 3
years.
Management contracts are a more comprehensive
arrangement, where the public authority transfers re-
sponsibility to a private contractor for the management
of a range of activities such as the O&M of a water
supply distribution system or major sub-system. Remu-
neration is usually based on a tendered fee plus an
incentive based component, using parameters such as
volume of water produced and improvements in bill
collection rates. The public authority usually finances
working and investment capital and determines cost
recovery policies. A typical contract duration is for 3 to
5 years.
Lease contracts, also known as Affermage, are used
where a private operator or lessor rents the facilities from
a public authority and is responsible for operating and
maintaining a complete system and collecting the tariffs.
The lessor effectively buys the rights to the income
stream from the utility’s operations and thus assumes a
significant share of the commercial risk associated with
those operations. The lessor generally provides the
working capital and the public authority deals with the
capital investment. The duration of a Lease contract can
be from 5 to 15 years.
BOT contracts, (Build, Operate and Transfer) is a
form of Concession whereby a private firm or consortium
agrees to finance, construct, operate and maintain a
facility for a specific period, before transferring the
facility to a Government or other public body. BOT
arrangements are attractive for new plants that require
large amounts of finance, for example, large water
treatment plants, but they are not suitable for water
distribution or wastewater collection systems. The con-
tract period is normally greater than 20 years, sufficient
for the private contractor to pay off loans and achieve a
return on investment. These contracts often require high
tariffs and/or subsidies to meet the BOT operators costs.
Concession contracts are very substantial in scope,
where the private sector company takes on full responsi-
bility not only for the O&M of the utility’s assets, but
also for investments, often for a whole city. Asset
ownership remains with the Government. Frequently the
concessions are bid according to price - the bidder who
proposes to operate the utility and meet the specific
investment and performance targets, for the lowest tariff,
wins the concession. The contract, which is usually over
a period of 25 - 30 years, sets out: the main performance
targets, the mechanism by which prices can be adjusted
over time and arrangements for arbitration of disputes
between the project partners. Concessions generally
require tariffs to be at a sufficiently high level at the start
of the contract to meet the full costs of service provision.
Current PSP trends
Concession and BOT contracts are increasingly seen as
beneficial means of attracting investment to the water
sector. A number of these contracts are being imple-
mented, particularly in South America, Francophone
Africa and South East Asia. International private sector
companies have been key participants in many of these
projects.
Buenos Aires, Argentina: after the first year of a
Concession Agreement for water and sewerage services
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, improvements in service
levels were already apparent. T he average time required
to carry out repairs was reduced from 180 hours to 48
hours and water shortages during the summer months
were reduced. Within two and half years the homes of an
additional 570,000 of the city’s inhabitants had been
connected to the water system.
Tirupur, India: the successful textiles industry of this
city in southern India currently receives all its water by
tankers and the city dwellers only receive water once in
two days. Tenders have been sought for an innovative
BOT project that will provide reliable water and sewer-
age services to the industrial area and the city. A special
purpose entity called the New Tirupur Area Develop-
ment Corporation Limited (NTADCL) has been set up to
implement the project and raise funds. The NTADCL
will have equity participation from local industry, state
and central government, the BOT operator and also
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services, who are
a financial institution that has done much of the prepara-
tory work in developing the project. It has been necessary
for changes to be made in Government policy, to enable
the scheme to go ahead. Progress on the project will be
carefully observed in order to learn lessons that can be
applied on similar projects elsewhere in India and thus
increase private sector finance in the sector.
Lease contracts have been let as a means of introducing
efficiency in a number of countries, such as Guinea,
Senegal and Poland. Management contracts also offer
improvements in efficiency with a degree of flexibility and
have been introduced in countries such as Columbia and
Trinidad and Tobago. Brief details of which are as follows:
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Cartgena, Columbia: a joint public/private company,
Acuacar, was created in 1995 to operate the city’s water
system under a 26 year Operation and Management
Contract. Acuacar , who have no investment obligations,
have achieved significant reductions in operating costs
and improved bill collection rates (from 50 per cent to 82
per cent) during the first year of the contract.
Trinidad and Tobago: a three year Management
Contract was awarded to a joint public/private company
to manage the entire spectrum of water resources through
to wastewater disposal in 1996. A Management contract
was chosen because it provided the flexibility in a
situation of poor information, undeveloped institutional
arrangements and slow legislative arrangements. The
contract has as its main objectives to improve customer
service, to turn round the company in financial terms and
to prepare for longer term PSP arrangements.
Service Contracts are becoming more popular in coun-
tries such as India where there have been difficulties in
the raising of tariffs sufficiently high for more compre-
hensive forms of PSP. Madras Metro Water Supply and
Sanitation Board has contracted out a variety of services
including the O&M of sewage pumping stations. In 1993
the O&M of 14 sewage pumping stations was contracted
out with savings of more than 20 per cent. Progressively
more pumping stations have been contracted out and this
year tenders have been sought for all 110 stations. Each
contract covers 3 or 4 stations. Other services contracted
out include the hiring of staff cars and water tankers, with
significant savings achieved. In Hyderabad the staffing
for the O&M of water treatment plants and a sewage
treatment plant have been contracted out with similar
savings. Service contracts have also been successfully let
in Ajmer in Rajasthan for the O&M of pipelines, a water
treatment plant and pumping stations. A key challenge
is the development of typical contract formats and
guidelines for the various contract options, to enable
utilities to select and develop appropriate types of con-
tract with a balance of risk sharing and incentives.
Development of sustainable private sector
participation
In the selection of appropriate functions to be contracted
out and the most suitable forms of contract, it is impor-
tant to establish what has already been contracted out by
the utility to date and what functions can be satisfactorily
managed by the private sector in the country concerned;
in order to determine future strategies with acceptable
Figure 2: Contracting Out of Services Profile for Water &Wastewater Utilities
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levels of risk. Figure 2 below is a Contracting Out of
Services Profile for a typical utility, whose functions
have been divided into 3 cores:
Core 1 - Customer protection and regulation functions
Core 2 - Management functions
Core 3 - Service functions
Core 1 functions cannot usually be contracted out and
are the key regulatory responsibilities of Government.
Core 3 contains the Service Functions which can be more
easily contracted out. By way of an example in Figure 2,
the functions that have been let to private contractors in
a typical water supply institution in India, using mainly
Service Contracts, have been underlined. Core 2 contains
the management functions which when contracted out,
offer the greater potential benefits, by introducing pri-
vate sector incentives with sufficient scope to manage,
provided that the regulatory issues have been adequately
addressed. The functions that would be included in a
BOT contract for a new water treatment plant and bulk
supply are highlighted with a [B] in Figure 2. A conces-
sion contract would encompass all of the functions in
cores 2 and 3, except the external audits and the owner-
ship of assets, which is clearly a large undertaking, but
offers substantial potential benefits. Concession, BOOT
and Lease contracts require comprehensive consumer
protection and regulatory arrangements, which are cur-
rently not in place in many developing countries. Serv-
ices can be contracted out using Management or Service
contracts, while such regulatory arrangements are being
developed. Concession, BOOT and Lease contracts gen-
erally require high transaction costs and entail higher
risks that need to be considered when a Water Utility is
developing its PSP strategies.
If a utility is facing problems both with the level of
service provided and raising tariffs sufficiently high to
attract investment finance (refer to Figure 1 above), a
more incremental learning approach should be consid-
ered, using Management, Service or Lease Contracts.
Such contracts should be sufficiently large to allow
private sector managers scope to innovate and make
savings. Whichever solution is adopted, agreement is
necessary on how risks are to be managed and the
inclusion of adequate positive and negative incentives
for the contractor to make improvements. When utilities
have learnt lessons from their contracting out and the
risks and benefits involved, they can consider using more
comprehensive forms of PSP. In all cases Customer
Protection and Regulation as well as Commercialisation
issues should be addressed, if the desired improvements
are to be achieved.
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Contracting-out water and sanitation services research project
The Water, Engineering and Development Centre, (WEDC) has commenced a research project entitled Contracting-Out Water and Sanitation Services,
that is funded by the Department for International Development, UK. The purpose of the research is to enable water utilities to  learn from each other
the extent to which they are contracting out what services with what benefits and by which contract approach, in order to encourage further use of
contracting out. The research includes two worldwide postal surveys with follow up field research. Key outputs from the research will be shared with
participating organisations. If you are interested in further information or wish to participate in the research, please contact Kevin Sansom at WEDC,
Loughborough University, Leicestershire., LE11 3TU, UK., tel: 0 44 1509 222617, fax: 0 44 1509 211079, Email: WEDC@lboro.ac.uk, WWW: http://
info.lboro.ac.uk/departments/cv/wedc/index.html.
